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Chapter Six: Actions
Conversion Table Wis. 2d or Wis. to N.W. 2d or N.W. 17. Dugenske v. Wyse, 194 Wis. 159, 165 (1927): "Under the facts in this case, however, where the mechanism was simple and where the jurors could determine this ultimate fact for themselves quite as well as any expert, the ruling (of inadmissibility], to say the least, is deemed unprejudicial."; Bent v. Jonet, 213 Wis. 635, 645 (1934): "Where there is no proper evidence of an order by the commission applicable to the situation, the jury must be left to determine the issue, and unless the matter is one involving skill and science, opinion evidence is not admissible."; Tiemann v. May, 235 Wis. 100, 108 (1940): "... The machinery was not complicated and the jury were quite capable of determining its safety without opinion evidence."
18.
Hommel v. Badger State Inv. Co., 166 Wis. 235, 241 (1917): "The subject was peculiarly one for expert evidence. it related to whether from an architectural standpoint, the place was as safe as its use would reasonably permit.";
Dugenske v. Wyse, 194 Wis. 159, 165 (1927): "Where the machinery is complicated and not readily understandable by a court or jury, such evidence undoubtedly would be helpful, and the refusal to permit its introduction may be deemed prejudicial error.";
Allison v. Wm. Doerflinger Co., 208 Wis. 206, 211 (1932): "Although the questions related somewhat to the ultimate issues to be passed upon by the jury, the solution and explanation of the problems, as to which the expert opinions were sought, necessitated special knowledge and skill in modern architecture and engineering to such an extent as to render such opinions on that subject admissible.";
Helms v. Fox Badger Theatres Corp., 253 Wis. 113 (1948);
Candell v. Skaar, 3 Wis. 2d 544, 552 (1958): "... Expert testimony would be admissible to explain the meaning and practical application of the requirement of 'nonslippery' surfacing.";
Powless v. Milwaukee County, 6 Wis. 2d 78, 84 (1959);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Thomas F. Co., 185 Wis. 98, 105 (1924);
Bellart v. Martell, 28 Wis. 2d 686, 693 (1965): "We have held, however, that expert opinions are admissible when they explain the meaning and practical application of the terms of safety orders and where the expert's special knowledge may be deemed helpful to the jury. ... Other expert witnesses testified as to the availability of a guard, to the use of guards on
similar mixers at other plants, and that without the guard the machine was not as safe as it reasonably could have been. This testimony was relevant to the issue whether the place of employment was kept as free from danger as the nature of the place of employment will reasonably permit."; See also
Bent v. Jonet, 213 Wis. 635, 644 (1934). For expert testimony on meaning of industrial commission order, see
Parchem v. St. Cecilia's Congregation, 28 Wis. 2d 227, 236 (1965).
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