(c) Burden of Proof

- actionable defect
- status of defendant
- status of plaintiff
- nature of the place (or involving "employment")
- not as safe as nature of same reasonably permitted
- control
- actual or constructive knowledge
- causation

However, as elsewhere pointed out, [5] where "there is a failure to fulfill a duty under the safe-place statute and an accident occurs which performance of that duty was designed to prevent, the law presumes that the damage was caused by the failure. The presumption may be rebutted, but if not rebutted by evidence, the plaintiff has met his burden of proof. [6]

The burden may be met by inference from the evidence. [7]

Conversion Table Wis. 2d or Wis. to N.W. 2d or N.W.

4. Paluch v. Baldwin Plywood & Veneer Co., 1 Wis. 2d 427, 432 (1957). See also Olson v. Whitney Bros. Co., 160 Wis. 606, 610 (1915); Paykel v. Rose, 265 Wis. 471, 473 (1953); Krause v. Menzner Lumber & Supply Co., 6 Wis. 2d 615, 620 (1959): "The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to show that the defendant failed to provide a place of employment free from danger to frequenters and employes as the nature thereof then reasonably permitted."; Rosenthal v. Farmers Store Co., 10 Wis. 2d 224, 227 (1960): "To create liability under the statute the injured party must show that a defect or hazardous condition existed, that such condition caused the injury, and that it had existed for a sufficient length of time to afford the owner or employer opportunity to discover and remedy the situation." As to burden on plaintiff to show who turned lights off, see Paepcke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 263 Wis. 290, 296 (1953).

5. Chapter 1, footnotes 140, 141.

6. Candell v. Skaar, 3 Wis. 2d 544, 549 (1958).

7. Anderson v. Joint School Dist., 24 Wis. 2d 580, 584 (1964): "... a jury could infer that the glass was not thick enough or strong enough and that, accordingly, the school district has not provided a door that was as safe or free from danger as the nature of the premises, including the door, would reasonably permit."