Boyle's Wisconsin Safe-Place Law



Chapter One: Nature of Safe-Place Law
    (n) Rules of Construction
It is held, as a general proposition, that the language of the safe-place statute "is plain and hardly open to judicial construction". [122] "The statute in unequivocal terms requires the employer to furnish employment which shall be as safe for the employees as the nature of the employment will reasonably permit, and also forbids the employer to permit the employees to work in an unsafe place. This language leaves no room for construction, or question as to legislative intent. It is therefore the duty of the Court to give it effect, and not defeat it by judicial construction contrary to its clear import." [123] "Any resort to subsidiary rules for construction to restrict the meaning would result in defeating the will of the lawmaking power instead of giving full effect thereto." [124] However, because the words of the statute are necessarily broad and general, some exercise of judicial discretion is called for in the application thereof to particular factual situations. In this area the courts have been mindful that the "history of the development of the safe-place statute... shows a conscious and deliberate intention on the part of the several legislatures to broaden its scope and to enlarge the sphere of its applicability", [125] and, accordingly, have held that the statute should be "liberally" construed or applied. [126] However, the court has restricted the application of the statute several times. It has done so in interpreting the term "frequenter" in order to preserve the doctrine of governmental immunity as to school districts, [127] (which limitation was later removed by the legislature); [128] and in interpreting the term "public" to exclude a member of the public at large injured when a glass block fell off the front of building," [129] and in requiring that an employer or owner have notice as a condition to liability where the defect was one of repair or maintenance. [130] As to this last restrictive interpretation, it was said that: "This is so in accord with the natural instincts of justice that a contrary purpose should not be imputed to a legislative act in the absence of an unequivocal declaration of such purpose." [131]

Conversion Table Wis. 2d or Wis. to N.W. 2d or N.W.

122. Rosholt v. Worden-Allen Co., 155 Wis. 168, 175 (1913); Tiemann v. May, 235 Wis. 100, 106 (1940); see also Heiden v. Milwaukee, 226 Wis. 92, 96 (1937): "The words of the statute are clear, plain, and unambiguous..."

123. Sparrow v. Menasha Paper Co., 154 Wis. 459, 465 (1913).

124. Kosidowski v. Milwaukee, 152 Wis. 223, 226 (1912).

125. Heiden v. Milwaukee, 226 Wis. 92, 98 (1937).

126. Tallman v. Chippewa Sugar Co., 155 Wis. 36, 39 (1913): "This is a statutory rule which should receive a liberal construction in favor of life, health, and limb."; Sadowski v. Thomas Furnace Co., 157 Wis. 443, 449 (1914): "...where open to construction, should be read liberally..."

127. Sullivan v. School District, 179 Wis. 502 (1923), where it was held that a pupil in a public school was not a frequenter. The court said [507]: "In order to abrogate the common-law doctrine, the intention ofthe legislature must be clearly expressed either in specific language or in such manner as to leave no reasonable doubt of its object."

128. Laws 1931, ch. 161, now Wis. Stat. Sec. 101.01(2)(e).

129. Delaney v. Supreme Investment Co., 251 Wis. 374 (1947). In the Delaney case the court said [380]: "This court has on numerous occasions held that the safe-place statutes are not to be extended so as to impose any duty beyond that imposed by the common law unless such statute clearly and beyond any reasonable doubt expresses such purpose by language that is clear, unambiguous, and peremptory."; and the court cited "Sullivan v. School District, 179 Wis. 502, 191 N.W. 1020 (1923); Lawver v. Joint District, 232 Wis. 608, 288 N.W. 192 (1939); Highway Trailer Co. v. Janesville Electric Co., 187 Wis. 161, 204 N.W. 773 (1925); Wisconsin B. & I. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 233 Wis. 467, 290 N.W. 199 (1940)." However, the Sullivan case so cited is explained, and the court's language given, at footnote 127, supra; the Lawver case involved the question of whether a flagpole was a public building and the court tested the question [612] "by the most liberal rules" -- the strict construction rule being applied to another statute; and the Highway Trailer Co. and Wisconsin B. & I. Co. cases did not involve the safe-place statute.

130. Pettric v. Gridley Dairy Co., 202 Wis. 289, 293 (1930); Boutin v. Cardinal Theatre Co., 267 Wis. 199, 202 (1954). See also Notice or Knowledge, Chapter 4, infra.

131. Footnote 130, supra. In the Pettric case the court went on to say: "We therefore consider that the legislative purpose will be given full scope if the language of the statute be interpreted in accordance with these natural principles of justice..."


Revised October 20, 2001

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